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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
EDMUND E. GREENWELL, 
Plwintvff and Respondent, 
-vs.-
R. C. DUVALL, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
I. 
THE APPEAL 
This is an appeal from a judgment of the District 
Court of Weber·County, Utah, Judge Charles G. Cowley, 
presiding, tried without a jury. The parties will be re-
ferred to as in the court below. 
II. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In Decernber of 1952, plaintiff loaned Five Thousand 
($5,000.00) Dollars to the Duvall Company, a Utah Cor-
poration. Subsequently the Duvall Company discon-
tinued operations and was liquidated. Plaintiff received 
Three Hundred Thirty Six ($336.00) Dollars from the 
Receiver upon liquidation (Tr. 179). In April, 1955, 
plaintiff filed this action against defendant personally, 
alleging fraud and misrepresentation on defendant's part 
had induced plaintiff to advance the Five Thousand 
($5,000.00) Dollars to the Dr~vall Company. Trial began 
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on June 18, 1958, and judgment of $67 48.14 was rendered 
in favor of plaintiff and against defendant on August 25, 
1958. This judgment represented the full Five Thousand 
( $5,000.00) Dollars comprising the loan, plus interest 
thereon at seven (7%) percent per annum from the date 
of the loan to the date of judgrnent, less Two Hundred 
Twenty Four ($224.00) Dollars received through liqui-
dation of the Company. On September 2, 1958, defendant 
moved the court to amend the findings and for additional 
findings, which motion was denied, except the court did 
amend the findings, conclusions and judgn1ent to reduce 
the interest computation from seven to six percent, and 
to increase the liquidating credit from Two Hundred 
Twenty Four ($224.00) Dollars to Three Hundred Thirty 
Six ( $336.00) Dollars. From this judgment defendant 
appeals. (R. 40 and 42). 
Because the evidence was extensive, covering a 10 
year period of time and many details of a commercial 
mining operation, the facts will be developed chronologi-
cally. 
Defendant is a pron1inent Utah business man, Presi-
dent of the Utah Savings and Loan League, President 
and Manager of the Ogden First Federal Savings and 
Loan Association, and a director of the C01mnercial Se-
curity Bank. 
In 1943, defendant first became acquainted \\ith the 
properties that were later to be kno'\\rn as the Duvall 
mine. These clailns were located in Cassia CountY Idaho 
. ' ' just over the Idaho line northwest of Snowville, upon 
the side of Black Pine Mountain. These properties were 
then being explored by the original o\\rners and a 
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Lawrence Berrett, an amateur prospector, whom defend-
ant knew ( Tr. 69). The owners, together with Berrett, 
continued their exploration activity until 1945, when 
defendant first became interested in the claims. At this 
time defendant visited the properties, and thereafter took 
an option for a lease upon 10 claims in the area. These 
clai1ns, together with others subsequently acquired by 
the Duvall Cmnpany, gave the company a mining area 
of approxlinately 400 acres (Tr. 70). 
Mr. Froerer came into the venture at about this 
time, and Berrett, Duvall and Froerer continued the ex-
ploratory work. From this time, until incorporation of 
the Company in 1950, defendant assumed the major share 
of the expense of the development work (Tr. 72). The 
three associates einployed an engineer, R. 0. Reddin, and 
followed the development program outlined by him for 
1945 and 1946, with stripping by means of a bulldozer, 
diarnond drilling, and other exploratory work (Tr. 71). 
In 1947, upon the recommendation of experienced 
mining men, they employed as consultant Roger Pierce, 
an eininently qualified Inining engineer (Tr. 75, 252-254). 
Pierce examined the properties, taking samples and hav-
ing assays made. Pierce's work was at his request double 
checked and independently duplicated by another highly 
qualified mining specialist, Miles P. Romney, who was 
then a geologist employed by United States Smelting 
and Refining Company, but who has for the past several 
years been the Executive Director of the Utah Mining 
Association, (Tr. 301). rrhese assays indicated ore of com-
mercial value, so Pierce caused metallurgical tests to be 
made to determine if the gold could economically be re-
covered frorn the ore. The results of these tests were 
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"very good" (Tr. 262). Thereafter, Pierce, in collabora-
tion with Romney, recommended extensive developn:ent 
to be done on the properties, which recommendations 
were followed by defendant and his associates (Tr. 257-
261). This work showed the ore body to be of substantial 
size and values. Large samples of the ore were now sub-
mitted to the American Cyanamid Company for metal-
lurgical and recovery tests, and the results of these tests 
were very favorable (Tr. 263-264). 
In January of 1950 Pierce submitted a written report 
(Ex. 3) to defendant. This report stated there were avail-
able 200,000 tons of proven and probable ore reserves 
having values of about $7.00 per ton. The report recom-
mended construction of a mill to process the ore, and 
estimated mining and milling costs totaling $3.28 per ton, 
which on the basis of 90% recovery (as reported by 
American Cyanamid Company) would leave a profit of 
$3.02 per ton, or $604,000.00. 
Upon this basis, the Duvall·Company was formed in 
the Spring of 1950, with defendant, Berrett and Froerer 
the chief stockholders. The mining claims and leases, 
together with all equipment then on the properties, were 
transferred to the Duvall Company at the time of incor-
poration. Up to this tiine, defendant had expended some 
$35,000.00 of his own 1noney in the development of the 
properties (Tr. 21). In order to construct the mill and 
begin operations, it was, of course, necessary to obtain 
funds. The C01npany borrowed from Ogden investors 
$60,000.00, with defendant, Berrett and Froerer putting 
in an additional $20,000.00. Miles P. Romney was em-
ployed as full time superintendent of the new operation, 
and under his direction the mill was erected (Tr. 309). 
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Operations began in September of 1950, and continued 
until winter weather necessitated closing. The recoveries 
made during the first year's operation were not good, 
so Romney spent the winter of 1950 and 1951 with How-
ard Heginbotham, a metallurgical specialist, in the labor-
atories of the University of Utah attempting to resolve 
the problen1s in the recovery process. As a result of this 
research, additional equiprnent was purchased and 
changes in the operation were made (Tr. 312). 
The following year recoveries were improved, but 
still not up to the anticipated returns. In August of 
1951 health reasons forced :Mr. Romney to leave the 
Duvall Company. (In January 1952, he took the position 
of manager of the Utah Mining Association, a position 
he still holds, and during the remaining life of the Com-
pany he actively consulted with and assisted the oper-
ators of the Duvall rnine). Mr. Val Demsey, another 
experienced 1nining engineer, but who is now deceased, 
\Yas employed to replace 1fr. Romney. Further plant 
changes as recmnrnended by the engineers were put into 
effect in 1951 and 1952 in attempting to increase the re-
coveries (Tr. 111, 316). 
In the fall of 1952, the engineers recmnmended in-
stallation of three additional thickener tanks. This 
change necessitated expenditures of over $31,500.00 (Tr. 
115). r:ro rneet these costs the company had to borrow 
additional funds. Defendant himself loaned $5,000 to 
the Duvall Company early in December 1952, shortly 
prior to the plaintiff's loan ( Tr. 117). Plaintiff at defend-
ant's request rnet defendant at defendant's office, where 
they discussed plaintiff's loan to the Duvall Company. 
Defendant informed plaintiff the money was needed for 
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the new tanks, to increase production (Tr. 174). At this 
time in December of 1952 occurred the conversation that 
' ' plaintiff predicates his action upon. 
With respect thereto plaintiff testified that defend-
ant told him that the Duvall Company had blocked out 
not less than 300,000 tons of ore ranging in value from 
$4.20 per ton to $50.00 per ton, and which averaged not 
less than $7.00 per ton. Defendant categorically denied 
that he so told the plaintiff. The court found (Finding 
4A, R. 27) that the defendant made the representation 
that there were 300,000 tons blocked out ranging in 
value from $4.20 per ton and less to $50.00 per ton, but 
further found that the representation was false only in 
that there were but 200,000 tons blocked out, rather than 
300,000. 
Plainiff further testified that defendant told hlln 
he had received an offer to buy the mine for $2,000,000, 
which had been refused because the mine was worth more 
than that. Defendant denied he had so stated. The Court 
found (Finding 4B, R. 27) that the representation was 
made and it was false in that no offer had been made. 
Plaintiff further testified that defendant told hlln 
that the Inine was in fine condition and all bills were paid 
and they were shipping ore at the rate of $30,000 a Inonth. 
Defendant denied that he had so stated to plaintiff. The 
Court found (Finding ±C, R. :27) only that defendant had 
represented that the 1nine was in fine condition, when 
in fact it was not in good financial or Inechanical oper-
ating condition. 
Plaintiff further testified that defendant told him 
that it would be ilupossible for any investor to lose a cent, 
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as there was more than enough ore blocked out to pay 
all notes with interest. Defendant denied that he had 
so represented. The Court found (Finding 4D, R. 27) 
that the statement had been made by defendant, when in 
truth the mining operation was then costing more than 
was being received, and there was not sufficient income 
fron1 operations to pay the costs of operations or the 
company's obligations. 
The mine operated again in the Spring of 1953, and 
operated through 1953 until October when it was closed 
and subsequently put into liquidation. During its 1953 
operations, the mine processed 60,450 tons of ore, with 
receipts of $169,131.20 (Ex. Y). However, the percentage 
of gold recoveries, despite the additional tanks and other 
improvements installed, remained relatively low, and the 
Cmnpany was forced to discontinue its operations. Dur-
ing the 4 years of operation, 113,409 tons of ore were 
mined, and the Company received $351,250.77 from sales 
of gold. Costs, including capital expenditures as well as 
operating costs, far exceeded the Company's receipts. 
(Ex. Y). 
Particularly significant facts developed at the trial 
include the following: 
The $5,000.00 advanced to the Duvall Company by 
plaintiff came from plaintiff's business checking account, 
and was shortly thereafter replaced by monies withdrawn 
frmn a savings account held jointly by plaintiff and 
plaintiff's wife (Tr. 210). In return for his $5,000.00, 
plaintiff received the note of the Duvall Company in 
that amount payable in two years with seven (7%) per-
cent interest, and stock in the Duvall Company of the 
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par value of $5,000.00 (Tr. 202). Both the note a~d 
stock were taken and held jointly by plaintiff and his 
wife, Matilda B. Greenwell (Ex. M and V). This stock 
was transferred to plaintiff and his wife from the private 
holdings of defendant, not from the Duvall Company. 
Defendant lost over $68,000.00 of his own n1oney on 
the development of the mining properties and loans to 
the Duvall Company, no part of which has been repaid 
(Tr. 140). Defendant did not receive any part of the 
$5,000.00 loaned by plaintiff, which was expended by the 
Duvall Company for the purposes defendant had ex-
plained to plaintiff (Tr. 128). Defendant received no 
compensation of any kind for his services to the Com-
pany or his expenses incurred and time used in behalf of 
the Company (Tr. 117-118). Defendant's good faith 
and belief in the Cmnpany are evidenced by the fact 
that he loaned $5,000 to the Company just a few days 
prior to plaintiff's loan. Throughout the entire life of 
the Company, and the development work prior to its 
organization, top 1nining engineers and consultants were 
constantly on the job. Defendant is not a nrining man, 
but he did seek the best n1en a-vailable and follmYed their 
advice throughout. There is no suggestion of misuse of 
corporate funds, excessive salaries, or other badges of 
fraud and personal aggrandize1uent. The operation was 
an honest, \\~en 1uanaged one and it is certainly not the 
fault of this defendant that the recovery proble:ms were 
never solved to the point of being able to operate profit-
ably. 
Certified public accountants \\~ere e1nployed by plain-
tiff's counsel to search for "financial irregularities" in 
the operation of the Duvall Cmnpany. The results of this 
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search were incorporated in a "Special Report for Cer-
tain Creditors, September 27, 1954." (Exhibit 13), ad-
dressed to Mr. Arthur I-I. Nielsen, Attorney at Law. This 
report contained the following statement of Mr. Nielsen's 
specially hired investigators : 
"While our examination was limited and 
could not be considered as an audit or even a test 
audit, we found no evidence of irregularities as 
far as recorded transactions are concerned. Mr. 
Stockdale informed us that in their examinations, 
which were more extensive than ours, they likewise 
found no evidence of irregularities, and that there 
were invoices or other data in the files to support 
every transaction that they checked." 
III. 
POINTS RELIED UPON FOR REVERSAL 
Defendant relies upon the following points for re-
versal of the lower court: 
1. The lower court erred in denying defendant's 
motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint, and in 
permitting plaintiff to amend his complaint dur-
ing the trial. 
2. The lower court erred in denying defendant's 
motion to dismiss at the conclusion of plaintiff's 
case. 
3. The lower court erred in receiving in evidence 
the testimony of the witnesses Felt, Tansil, 
Douglas, Foulger and Shreeve. 
4. The evidence in favor of plaintiff is not clear 
and convincing, and does not support the find-
ings of fact or the judgment. 
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5. The representations found by the court to have 
been made were not actionable as a matter of 
law. 
6. The lower court neglected and refused to make 
findings of fact as required by the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure. 
7. There is no proof of damage to plaintiff in this 
case. 
IV. ARGUMENT 
1. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DENYING DE-
FENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S 
COMPLAINT, AND IN PERMITTING PLAINTIFF 
TO AMEND HIS COMPLAINT DURING THE TRIAL. 
Plaintiff:s complaint, as originally filed on April 
6, 1955, was fatally defective in that (a) while pleading 
that the alleged representations were generally false, the 
plaintiff did not plead the particulars or degree of the 
falsity as required under Rule 9 (b), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, and as required by this Court's decision in 
the case of Davis Stock Company z:. Hill, 2 Utah (2) 20, 
268 P. (2) 988, and (b) it predicated damages, which is 
an essential element of fraud, upon the Duvall Con1pany's 
insolvency at the tin1e the complaint was filed, son1e two 
and a half years after the transaction cmnplained of, 
rather than upon the basis of the factual situation exist-
ing at the time of the transaction. 
Following the filing of the complaint, defendant 
moved to dis1niss it upon the ground of its failing to 
state any claim, (R. 3), which motion the court after 
' hearing, denied. The defendant then answered, raising 
tlris point as its First Defense (R. 5), and in due course 
10 
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took the plaintiff's deposition upon the basis of the com-
plaint as it stood. No pre-trial conference was called 
by the Court, and thus the matter remained until the case 
came on for trial on June 18, 1958. At the commencement 
of the trial the defendant renewed the objection under 
his first defense, (Tr. 1), and then the plaintiff for the 
first time asked leave to amend to (1) add the particulars 
of falsity, (2) to add an allegation of insolvency at the 
time of the transaction, and ( 3) to add completely new 
grounds for relief, i.e., additional representations claimed 
to have been made by defendant and relied upon by plain-
tiff. (Tr. 4, Amendment to complaint, R. 16). 
Defendant, while recognizing the policy of the rules 
to be such as to allow amendments freely when justice 
so requires, nevertheless felt obligated to object in this 
case because not only did justice not require the request-
ed leave to amend, but granting leave under the circum-
stances constituted a gross abuse of discretion which 
this Court should rectify. 
In the first place, defendant had prepared for trial 
upon the basis of the complaint as originally filed, and in 
so doing he was doubly justified, first, because the com-
plaint as pleaded constituted the only charge against him, 
and secondly, because defendant had taken plaintiff's 
deposition in which plaintiff was carefully examined with 
respect to the allegations of the complaint, and in which 
deposition defendant had gone even further and asked 
plaintiff specifically if the charges contained in the 
complaint contained all of the charges upon which he was 
relying, and plaintiff replied that it did. (See page 10 
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"Q. I take it you have read the complaint that was 
filed in your behalf in this action~ 
A. Correct. . "~ 
Q. And you read it before it was f1led or after · 
A. After. 
Q. After it was filed, but you now know what 
it contains. 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And that complaint states the charges which 
you make and desire to make against Mr. 
Duvall~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And states them fully~ 
A. Yes, sir. I'll correct my answer. I read the 
complaint before it was filed." 
Thus, despite plaintiff's solemn assertion to defend-
ant that the original complaint stated fully the alleged 
misrepresentations upon which plaintiff relied for re-
covery, the court, over defendant's objections, permitted 
during the trial amendments thereto which added com-
pletely new charges of misrepresentation as to which 
defendant had never been previously informed. 
Further than that, the arnendn1ents permitted are-
affirmation by plaintiff of rnatters which he had under 
oath disavowed in his deposition. For exarnple, both in 
the original c01nplaint and in the arnendrnents, plaintiff 
alleged that defendant represented to hiin (1) that all 
of the bills of the C01npany were paid, and (2) that it 
would be impossible for any investor to lose a cent. Yet 
in his deposition he had expressly disavowed that Mr. 
Duvall had so represented. At page 8 and 9 of the de-
position is the following: 
"Q. Did he say to you on that occasion that the 
operating bills were paid~ 
A. No, he told me it was in fine condition they, 
12 ' 
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were shipping regularly. 
Q. But you don't recall his making the statement 
that the operating bills were paid. 
A. Not in those words, no. I knew some of them 
were not paid because they had the tanks and 
they were not paid for. 
Q. So that you knew there were some unpaid 
bills. 
A. I presumed there was." 
And further on page 9 : 
"Q. Now, did he say to you that because there 
was more than enough ore blocked out to pay 
all notes with interest, it would be impossible 
for anyone to lose any money in it~ 
A. I don't know as he said anyone. He said there 
was maybe enough blocked out that I would 
receive my money before the end of the year 
rather than two years." (Italics added.) 
And so the lower court, by allowing the amendments, 
permitted the paintiff at the time of trial not only to 
completely reverse himself on the element of damages by 
switching frorn insolvency in 1955 to insolvency in 1952, 
but also to reassert representations completely disavowed 
by hiln in the discovery processes. 
~N e submit that a party plaintiff is not to be per-
1Lutted to thus play fast and loose with a defendant's 
defenses and with his trial preparation, and the lower 
court erred in permitting the amendments to plaintiff's 
complaint. 
2. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DENYING DE-
FENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS AT THE CON-
CONCLUSION OF PLAINTIFF'S CASE. 
Plaintiff's theory of his cause of action as evidencerl 
by his pleadings and proof was that he had been induced 
13 
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by false representations of the defendant to make a loaiJ 
of $5,000.00 to the Duvall Company. That because of the 
falsity of the representaions the Duvall Company was 
unable to repay the loan, and as a consequence plaintiff 
was damaged in the amount of the unpaid loan. Thus the 
cause of action was pleaded and attempted to be proven. 
During the course of plaintiff's proof, however, he 
introduced in evidence the promissory note of the Duvall 
Company which had been received by him to evidence the 
Company's obligation, and it there appeared that the 
note was payable not to the plaintiff alone, but to "Ed-
mund E. Greenwell and Mathilda B. Greenwell, husband 
and wife, as joint tenants with full right of survivorship, 
and not as tenants in common". (Exhibit :JI). 
He further testified that he initially made the loan 
by drawing a check upon his business account, but shortly 
thereafter replaced the money in his business account 
by withdrawing a like amount from a savings and loan 
account which he and his wife, Mathilda B. Greenwell, 
jointly owned. He further testified that his wife, :Jiatlril-
da B. Greenwell was still alive. (Tr. 209, 210). 
Thus plaintiff established by his o-w11 testilnony not 
only that the unpaid obligation of the Duvall -company 
by which his dan1ages were to be 1neasured, was an ob-
ligation in which his wife had an interest and not one 
as to which he was the sole owner, but also that the funds 
themselves which con1prised the loan were funds in which 
she had an ownership interest. 
Upon the conclusion of plaintiff's evidence the 
' plaintiff rested, and thereupon the defendant 1noved for 
dismissal upon the ground, among others, that the plain-
14 
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rL 
tiff had failed to prove actionable damage to himself in 
any identifiable amount, and for the further reason that 
Mrs. Greenwell was an indispensable party. Plaintiff did 
not seek leave to reopen to supplement his proof of 
damages, nor seek in any way to have Mrs. Greenwell 
brought in either as a witness or as a party. 
At the outset we recognize that there is some split 
In the authorities upon the proposition that persons 
jointly injured by the fraud of another must jointly sue 
to recover the damage. We do not find that this Court 
has ever passed upon this point, but sub1nit that the 
better reasoned view is that they must so join in assert-
ing the fraud, particularly in the light of the provisions 
of Rule 19 (a) and (b), U.R.C.P. as follows: 
"(a) NECESSARY JOINDER. Subject to the 
provisions of Rule 23 and of subdivision (b) of 
this rule, persons having a joint interest shall be 
made parties and be joined on the same side as 
plaintiffs or defendants. When a person who 
should join as a plaintiff refuses to do so, or his 
consent cannot be obtained, he may be made a 
defendant, or in proper cases, an involuntary 
plaintiff. 
"(b) ElTFECT OF FAILURE TO JOIN. When 
persons who are not indispensable, but who ought 
to be parties if complete relief is to be accorded 
between those already parties, have not been Inade 
parties and are subject to the jurisdiction of the 
court as to service of process, the court shall 
order them summoned to appear in the action. 
The Court in its discretion may proceed in the 
action without 1naking such persons parties, if its 
jurisdiction over them can be acquired only by 
their consent or voluntary appearance; but the 
judgment rendered therein does not affect the 
15 
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rights or liabilities of absent persons." 
With this we submit for the Court's consideration 
the case of Evola Realty Co. v. Westerfield (Ky) 251 
S.W. (2) 298, a fraud action: 
"By special demurrer and also in their ans~er 
appellants raised the question of defect of parties 
in that appellee, Nellie B. Westerfield, had no 
authority to maintain this action unless Earl F. 
Westerfield was joined as a party thereto. It 
stands admitted that Mr. Westerfield was a joint 
purchaser of the property under the contract 
dated May 23, 1944, and that he later became a 
joint grantee in the deed. The record does not 
disclose that Mr. Westerfield assigned to his for-
mer wife the right to sue for damages in respect 
to the property; nor do appellee's pleadings show 
any facts that would preclude his being made a 
party to this litigation. 
"Under Section 18 of the Civil Code of Practice 
every action 1nust be prosecuted in the name of 
the real party or parties in interest. In the joint 
acquisition of the house, if any damage was sus-
tained by virtue of fraud, appellee does not have 
the sole right to collect all of the damage but she 
and Earl F. \Vesterfield must jointly maintain 
an action for such recovery. This is a suit based 
upon tort, and the applicable rule is well stated 
in 24 A1n. Jur., Fraud and Deceit. Sec. 240, P. 69, 
in this language : 
'Under accepted principles of practice per-
sons jointly affected by a tort must join in an 
action to recover for the injury. Joint pur-
chasers of real estate bought in reliance upon 
false representations concerning the size and 
loc~tion of the propert)- n1ust join in an 
action to recover da1nages for the fraud thus 
perpetrated upon then1, as 1nust partners, 
who seek to recover damages for fraud in-
16 
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eluding the sale of the firm property.' 
"As Mr. Westerfield was a necessary party to this 
action, the trial court committed reversible error 
when it refused to sustain the special demurrer 
and thereby authorized appellee to sue in her 
name alone. See also 39 Am. J ur ., Parties, Sec. 
32, P. 896." 
Notwithstanding this authority, however, and as-
suming for the sake of the argument that the plaintiff 
has in fact and in law an independent claim for his own 
damage, namely, a claim that is not dependent upon a 
joinder therein by the other co-owner, he must, in order 
to prove his claim, prove hit; own damage. This court has 
held, Kinnear v. Prows, 81 Utah 135, 16 P. (2) 1094, and, 
so far as we know, its a rule of universal application, 
that a fraud action is unlike other tort actions in which 
damage may be assumed, because in a fraud action dam-
age is an essential elernent of the offense itself, and must 
be proven by clear and convincing evidence, the same as 
the other elements. 
Now what is the proof of damage in this case~ While 
proof is that the obligation of the Duvall Company under 
this note is unpaid, the proof further shows that such 
obligation is not wholly owned by plaintiff, and certainly 
plaintiff could not be damaged in any event beyond the 
amount of his ownership interest therein. 
In G.arrett v. Ellison, 93 Utah 184, 72 P. (2) 449, 
this court held : 
"The note, the subject of this controversy, as 
heretofore indicated sirnply designated two 
payees, to either of which payrnent could be made. 
'Such a note raises the presumption of a joint 
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ownership and of a coequal interest in the~, 
but this does not preclude proof that theu 
interests were separate and unequal.' 8 C.J; 
177, Sec. 302; Tisdale v. Maxwell, 58 Ala. 40. 
"Where a conveyance is made in the names of a 
number of parties to an instrument, and the con-
veyance does not show respective interests, the 
presumption is that they own in equal shares, but 
such presumption 1s rebuttable by parol 
evidence." 
Thus, in a proper case it might be said that presump-
tively Mr. and Mrs. Greenwell owned the note equally, 
and in the absence of evidence to the contrary the plain-
tiff would be entitled to recover damages based upon 
half its face amount. Frankly, we do not agree that such 
presumption could be indulged in the present case, be-
cause it is not a conclusive presumption and is in no 
wise binding on Mrs. Greenwell. In other words, without 
Mrs. Greenwell before the court in some capacity-as a 
party defendant under Rule 19 (b) if necessary, the 
court was powerless to determine the O"\\Tflership interest 
of plaintiff in the note, or indulge any presumptions in 
aid thereof, and \\rithout a detennination of plaintiff's 
ownership interest the court was without a yardstick to 
measure his damage. Certainly in fixing his damage in 
the full face anwunt of the note, less the non1inal payment 
that had been received through liquidation of the com-
pany, and in awarding judg1uent in such runount, the 
lower court was not only arbitrary and capricious, but 
it acted in total disregard of evidence that conclusively 
established that he was not sole owner of the obliO'ation 
0 
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3. 'THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RECEIVING IN 
EVIDENCE 'THE TESTIMONY OF THE WITNESS-
ES FELT, TANSIL, DOUGLAS, FOULGER AND 
SHREEVE. 
During the presentation of plaintiff's case the lower 
court received, over defendant's objections, the testimony 
of the witnesses Felt, Tansil, Douglas, Foulger and 
Shreeve, which testi1nony was to the effect that the de-
fendant had, on specified occasions, made statements to 
them concerning the mine. These statements were not 
made in the presence of the plaintiff, nor were they re-
layed to him, nor were they made in relationship in any 
way to plaintiff's transactions. The transaction with 
plaintiff, and the date of the statements to hiin, was De-
cember 22, 1952. The dates of the statements to those 
other witnesses were as follows: 
Felt- November 15, 1951 (Tr. 218). 
Tansil - April 24, 1952 (R. 220) 
Douglas- May 5, 1952 (Tr. 224) 
Foulger- October, 1951 (Tr. 222). 
Shreeve- June, 1951 (Tr. 225). 
Thus the representations which were the subject of 
Felt's testimony were nmde thirteen months prior to the 
representations to plaintiff. Those to Tansil were made 
eight Inonths prior. Those to Douglas were made 
nearly eight months prior. Those to Foulger were made 
fifteen months prior, and those to Shreeve were made 
a year and one-half prior to Dec. 22, 1952. The testimony 
was received by the court, over defendant's objections 
(Tr. 217, 219, 222, 225, 226) upon the issue of defendant's 
motive and intent. (Tr. 215) 
19 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
This court in two previous cases has considered this 
question. In Trout and Resort Company vs Lewis, 41 
Utah 183, 125 P. 687, this court quoted the rule enuncia-
ted in 6 Ency. Ev. p. 33 with approval as follows: 
"Where the fraudulent intent of a party in the 
performance of an act is in issue, proof o~ other 
similar fraudulent acts is relevant and admissable 
to establish his intent or motive in the perfor-
mance of the act in question, when it appears that 
there is such a connection between such other acts 
and the act in question as to authorize the infer-
ence that both are parts of one scheme or plan, in 
which the same motive is operative, and it is im-
material whether such other frau-dulent acts oc-
curred before or after the act in question, as re-
moteness in point of time affects only their 
weight. Evidence of such other fraudulent act.:; 
is usually offered upon the issue of motive or 
intent, and some of the decisions limit its com-
petency to the proof of these issues. Such evi-
dence, however, has been held competent to estab-
lish the party's knowledge of the falsity of his 
representations, to prove a system of fraud or 
a fraudulent conspiracy, and to identify the per-
son charged as the fraudulent actor." (Italics 
supplied) 
And in Smith v. Gilbert, 49 Ctah 510, 164 P. 1026, 
the court quoted from Trout v Len·is,. supra, as follows: 
"False representations, siinilar to the ones in-
volved in an action, are adn1issible where the 
intent, motive, or lmowledge of their falsity by 
the party 1naking the1n are Inaterial, or where it 
is sought to prove a syste1n or general plan or 
sche1ne to defraud." (Italics supplied) 
In each case, it is to be noted, the rule is lhnited to 
si1nilar "fraudulent acts" or similar "false representa-
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tions". Similar representations as such, made to another, 
do not ipso facto qualify ·under the rule, but it is only 
when such similar acts or representations are themselves 
shown to be false or fraudulent that they become admis-
sible. To qualify their admissibility the party offering 
them must first lay the foundation of falsity and fraud-
ulentness as to them, which the plaintiff in this case 
neither did nor attempted to do. 
The logic and soundness of this requirement cannot 
be denied. A simple example will demonstrate. If A, to 
induce B to n1ake a loan to X Company represents to B 
that X is paying Inonthly dividends, and the representa-
tion is false the same may be actionable as to B, assuming 
the other essential elements of fraud are present. During 
the trial of B's action he seeks to prove that a year earl-
ier A had made the same representation to C. The X 
Company may well have been paying dividends at the 
time the representation was made to C, and the repre-
sentation thus be truthful as to C. Accordingly, the rule 
must of necessity be, as stated in the Utah cases, supra, 
that it is only similar fraudulent acts or false represen-
tations that are admissible upon the question of intent, 
motive or common scheme, and until they are shown to 
be fraudulent or false as to the witness they are not 
admissible in the action. 
The plaintiff having failed to lay the foundation 
necessary to admissibility, the testimony was inadmis-
sible for any purpose, and the court erred in receiving 
it. 
There is still a further reason why the testimony 
was inadmissible in this case. There was and has been no 
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contention on the part of the plaintiff that the transac-
tion involving the plaintiff was a part of a common 
scheme or plan also involving the other witnesses, nor, 
of course, is there any evidence to support any such 
claim. Further there was and has been no contention on 
the part of the defendant that he didn't intend to say 
what he did say, that is, no mistake is claimed by him, 
nor is there any contention but that his motive was that 
his representations be relied upon by plaintiff and a loan 
be induced. This was the point before the Supreme Court 
of Oregon in Menefee v. Blitz (Ore) 179 P. (2) 550: 
"It is next contended that evidence of similar 
frauds is admissible to prove 'motive, intent or 
scienter.' The rule governing that contention is 
stated in Wigmore on Evidence, 3d Ed., Sec. 341; 
37 ·C.J.S., Fraud, Sec. 113 page 42±, and 24 A.m. 
Jur. Fraud and Deceit Sec. 270, page 109. The 
latter authority says, in part: 'An important limi-
tation upon the adlnissibility of similar frauds is 
that they are competent only on the issue of 
motive or intention, and, hence, are not admissible 
in an action for fraud in which the right to relief 
does not depend upon establishing _scienter, 
motive or intent.' 
"The challenged evidence does not prove or dis-
prove that Mr. Blitz knew that the representations 
which it is clain1ed he 1nade ·were false. Hence, 
the testimony of 1\fr. Sheppard and ~Ir. 1\Ienefee, 
Sr., showed nothing concerning scienter. Intent 
and motive were not in issue upon the trial. \Y e 
have shown by quotation frmn the answer that 
the appellant adlnitted that 1\fr. Blitz sold to the 
respondent 20,000 shares of stock for $5.000 and 
that in so doing he told the respondent , that 'an 
oil sand had been discovered at a depth of 700 
feet in the well whi~~ was being drilled.~ Thus, 
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it was conceded that Mr. Blitz's statements to 
the respondent were made with the intention of 
inducing him to buy stock. It was freely admitted 
at the trial that after the drilling operations 
started Mr. Blitz talked to several men for the 
purpose of persuading them to join him in the 
venture, and that some of them contributed cap-
ital. Mr. Ulrich persuaded his brother-in-law to 
join the venture, and, referring to Mr. Sheppard, 
testified: 'I was trying to get Blitz to get him in 
for his advice and counsel, I wasn't particular 
about getting any money out of him.' According 
to one of the exhibits, Mr. Blitz said before his 
death: 'My whole talk with everybody was that I 
didn't want any widows or orphans in. If they 
couldn't afford to gamble, I advised them not to 
come in.' Thus there was no issue at the trial con-
cerning intent or motive. The· i:ssue was whether 
or not the statements which Mr. Blitz made to the 
respondent were true or false." (Italics Added) 
Common scheme or plan, intent and motive, not being 
issues in the case, the testimony of those witnesses was 
clearly improper, and served no purpose but to clearly 
prejudice the defendant in his denials that the represen-
tations were ever made. 
Again we call the court's attention to the fact that 
under the above case, as well as under the rule therein 
quoted from Wigmore, C.J.S. and Am. Jur. that even 
where intent and motive is an issue it is only sin1ilar 
fra·uds that are admissible. Until the similar represen-
tations have themselves been shown to be fraudulent, 
they are not admissible for any purpose. 
We submit that the court committed patent and 
reversible error in receiving the testimony of these wit-
nesses as it did. 
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4. THE EVIDENCE IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFF IS 
NOT CLEAR AND CONVINCING, AND DOES NOT 
SUPPORT 1THE FINDINGS OF FACT OR THE 
JUDGMENT. 
Not Clear and Convincing. By the original 
complaint, plaintiff alleged that defendant made certain 
representations, false in nature, upon which he relied to 
his damage. Those representations, as pleaded by plain-
tiff, were as follows: 
(a) That 300,000 tons of ore had been blocked out 
which assayed as high as $50.00 per ton. 
(b) That an offer of $2,000,000 had been turned 
down for the mine because of its greater value. 
(c) That all operating bills were paid, and every-
thing was going fine at the mine. 
(d) That it would be impossible for any investor 
to lose one cent of money, as there ·was more 
than enough ore blocked out to pay all notes 
with interest. 
Plaintiff's deposition ,,-as taken (Exhibit 12), in 
which he reaffirn1ed in effect the representations in (a) 
and (b) above, denied that defendant had represented to 
him that all bills were paid, as he had alleged in (c) 
above, (Ex. 12 Pg. 8 and 9), and with respect to (d) 
stated that what defendant had actually told him was 
only that "There was 1naybe enough ore blocked out 
that I would receive 111y n1one~~ before the end of the year, 
rather than two years". (Ex. 1:2, Pg. 9). Thus, as between 
his cmnplaint and his deposition there was a direct con-
flict as to plaintiff hhnself with respect to representa-
tions (c) and (d). He further testified in his deposition 
(Ex. 12 Pg. 10) that the complaint stated "fully" his 
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charges against the defendant. 
Subsequently and during the trial, plaintiff amended 
his complaint and reasserted the (c) and (d) representa-
tions of his original complaint (which he had disavowed 
in deposition), and, despite the fact that he had sworn 
under oath in his deposition that there were no other 
representations upon which he relied, he added new rep-
resentations claimed to have been made to him by defen-
dant as follows : 
(e) That the minimum value of the ore was $4.20 
per ton. 
(f) That the average value of the ore body was 
$7.00 per ton. 
(g) That they were shipping ore at the rate of 
$30,000 per month. 
As a witness on his own behalf he testified that all 
of the representations (a) through (g) were made to 
him by defendant on this short visit he made to Mr. 
Duvall's office. His testimony in this connection was in 
no wise corroborated and was categorically denied by 
defendant. Thus, the proof of whether the representa-
tions were or were not made lay solely in the sworn 
word of plaintiff that they were, and of defendant that 
they were not. 
Under the decisions of this court, plaintiff's proof 
of fraud must be by "clear and convincing evidence". 
Pace v. Parrish, 122 Utah 141, 247 P (2) 273. In the case 
of Greener vs Greener, 116 Utah 571, 212 P. (2) 
194, the court considered the meaning of "Clear and 
convincing" proof as follows: 
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"But for a matter to be clear and convincing to 
a particular mind it must at least h~ve reached 
the point where there remains no senous or sub-
stantial doubt as to the correctness of the conclu-
sion. A mind which was of the opinion that it was 
convinced and yet which entertained, not a slight, 
but a reasonable doubt as to the correctness of its 
conclusion, would seem to be in a state of con-
fusion." 
In Paulson v. Coombs, 123 Utah 49, 253 P (2) 621, 
this court held that while the trial court's conclusions 
should be given weight, this court reserves the right to 
review the matter. 
"The question of whether evidence is sufficient 
to be clear and convincing is primarily for the 
trial court; his finding should not be disturbed 
unless we must say as a matter of law that no 
one could reasonably find the evidence to be clear 
and convincing." 
We submit that this is a case in which this court 
should well say that "no one could reasonably find the 
evidence to be clear and convincing'' in favor of the 
plaintiff. Let us review the matter. 
Plaintiff and defendant are both long tune reputable 
business men of Ogden-plaintiff as a merchant and 
restaurant operator-defendant as a director of a bank 
and as president of a savings and loan association. Plain-
tiff, having never previously heard of the mining opera-
tion, and with no inforn1ation as to who was connected 
with it, and with no infonnation whatever as to its cor-
porate or financial structure (other than that defendant 
was its president) after a conference of from fifteen 
minutes to half hour with defendant, agreed to loan 
and did loan the company $5,000.00. He clailns he was 
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induced to do so by the representations of the defendant 
above set forth. 
Defendant, on the other hand, denied categorically 
that he made the representations claimed by plaintiff, 
and on the contrary testified that he had reviewed with 
him generally the problerns the company had had in the 
past in getting recoveries that the engineers and lab-
oratories had assured him could be expected, told him 
that the engineers felt that they were getting the opera-
ting problems solved and with the installation of new 
tanks the operation should be successful. Also that de-
spite the problems of the past he had confidence in the 
future, and had himself put in $5,000.00 more about two 
weeks earlier. Defendant's testimony was without equiv-
ocation. 
As compared to this, plaintiff contradicted himself 
time and time again. For example he first claimed that 
defendant told hirn all bills were paid and that no invest-
or would lose a cent. Later under oath by way of de-
position he acknowledged that defendant did not tell him 
all bills were paid, and acknowledged that he then knew 
of outstanding bills. Further in his deposition he testified 
that instead of defendant stating that no investor would 
lose a cent as there was more than enough ore blocked 
out to pay all notes with interest, what defendant had 
really said was that there was maybe enough ore blocked 
out that he would get his money back in a year instead 
of two. Thus, at this point there was direct contradiction 
by plaintiff himself on two vital parts of his evidence. 
Still later and at the trial, while acknowledging 
that he had testified in his deposition as above set out, 
he disavowed the same and reasserted his earlier claims 
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-thus contradicting his sworn deposition. 
Further, in his deposition he testified that his orig-
inal complaint stated "fully" the representations made 
by defendant, but at the trial claimed that still others 
had been made, namely, that the ore had a minimum 
value of $4.20 per ton, that it averaged $7.00 per ton, 
and that the company was shipping $30,000.00 worth of 
gold a month. 
Significant is the fact that the trial court itself dis-
believed his trial testimony to a very considerable degree, 
for, as evidenced by its findings, it did not believe his 
testimony that defendant represented that the bills were 
paid, that the minimum value of the ore was $4.20, that 
its average value was $7.00, or that the company was 
shipping $30,000.00 of gold a month. 
Nevertheless and despite these many contradictions, 
and despite the conflicts in plaintiff's own sworn testi-
mony, and despite the trial court's determination that 
it could not believe parts of plaintiff's testimony with 
regard to the representations, the trial court found in 
plaintiff's favor. 
Were this a case in which this court was bound to 
uphold the trial court if there "-as any evidence to sup-
port its findings, the point now being discussed would 
never be raised. Such, however, is not tlris case, because 
any evidence is not enough. The evidence must be clear 
and convincing, and this court 1nust review it to deter-
mine if it 1neets that test. 
Charges of fraud are easy to n1ake and hard to de-
fend against, particularly where, as here, the principals 
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alone were present. Thus it is that the law requires clear 
and convincing proof of fraud, and we submit that plain-
tiff's testimony, so shot full of contradictions and con-
flicts as it is does not as a matter of law arise to the 
dignity of clear and convincing proof required in a fraud 
action. 
Here the vice in receiving the testimony of the wit-
nesses Felt, Tansil, Douglas, Foulger and Shreeve as 
to representations purportedly made to them, is accentu-
ated. Absent that testimony, and in the light of the con-
tradictions and conflicts in plaintiff's testimony, it is 
obvious that no one could reasonably find that plaintiff's 
evidence on the matter was "clear and convincing". But 
that evidence was in, and while it was ostensibly received 
for a limited purpose, it taxes the credulity to believe 
that it did not play a vital, albeit an improper, part in 
the trial court's finding that the representations were 
made. 
5. THE REPRESENTATIONS FOUND BY THE COURT 
TO HAVE BEEN MADE WERE NOT A·CTIONABLE 
AS A MA'TTER OF LAW. 
The lower court found that certain representations 
were 1nade by defendant to plaintiff which representa-
tions were false, and in reliance thereon plaintiff made a 
loan to the Duvall Company to his damage. 
We have heretofore demonstrated that the lower 
court erred in finding the representations were made for 
the reason that plaintiff's evidence in support thereof 
was anything but clear and convincing, but we now ap-
proach the matter from the standpoint that even if they 
were made, they and each of them are not actionable as a 
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matter of law. 
The representations so found by the court to have 
been made are as follows : 
"4. Said false and fraudulent representa-
tions so made to the Plaintiff are as follows: 
"(A) That said Duvall Mining Company 
had, as a result of diamond drilling and tunnel-
ling, blocked out 300,000 tons of ore containing 
Gold ranging in value from $4.20 per ton and 
less, to as high as $50.00 per ton \Yhen in truth 
and in fact Defendant well knew that only 200,000 
tons of proven and probable ore had been blocked 
out. 
"(B) That Defendant had received an offer 
to buy said mine for $2,000,000.00 which offer had 
been refused because said mine was worth more 
than that, when in truth and in fact Defendant 
well knew that no offer whatever had been re-
ceived for the purchase of said mine. 
" (C) That said mine was then in fine con-
dition, when in truth and in fact Defendant well 
knew that said mine was not in fine condition, 
either financially or in good 1nechanical operating 
condition. 
"(D) That it would be impossible for any 
investor to lose one cent of n1oney, as there wa8 
more than enough ore blocked out to pay all the 
notes with interest, \vhen in truth and in fact 
said 1nining operation was then costing 1nort~ 
than was being received therefrmn, and there was 
not sufficient incmne frmn production to pay the 
obligations owing by the corporation or the costs 
of operation." (Paragraph 4 of Findings, R. 27) 
By a series of decisions, of which Pace Y. Parrish, 
122 Utah 141, 247 P. (2) 273, is one of the leading, tllis 
court has held that actionable fraud consists of a series 
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of elements, each of which is essential to recovery. We 
confine ourselves for present purposes to a consideration 
of but two of these elmnents, (1) the representation must 
be of a presently existing material fact, and (2) the 
damage must proximately flow from its falsity. If the 
representation is not of a material fact, or, even if dam-
age be shown, and it is not shown to have resulted from 
the falsity of the representation, plaintiff's action fails. 
We submit that either one or both of these essential ele-
ments is lacking with respect to each representation 
found by the court to have been made. 
(a) The first representation found by the court 
to have been made is that: 
"The Duvall Company had as a result of 
diamond drilling and tunnelling blocked out not 
less than 300,000 tons of ore containing gold rang-
ing in value from $4.20 per ton and less to as high 
as $50.00, when in truth and in fact Defendant 
well knew that only 200,000 tons of proven and 
probable ore had been blocked out." (Finding 4 
(a), R. 27) 
It is to be noted that the court did not find falsity 
as to the ore values, but only as to the tonnage, so we 
concern ourselves only with the representation in its re-
lat~~nship to the number of tons blocked out. Unless the 
falsity of that representation, namely, that there were 
300,000 tons blocked out when in truth there were but 
200,000 tons, proximately resulted in damage, plaintiff's 
cause of action as predicated upon that representation 
fails as a matter of law. 
The uncontradicted evidence in the case shows that 
the cmnpany started its mining operations in the Fall 
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of 1950 and discontinued them in the Fall of 1953. To 
' the end of showing the extent of the Company's opera-
tions by years, and the cost thereof in comparison to 
revenues, plaintiff, as a part of his case, put in evidence 
Exhibit Y, a recap of the operations, ·which was and is 
uncontradicted and uncontested. The exhibit showed that 
in 1950 there was processed 4,491 tons ; in 1951, 21,468 
tons; in 1952, 27,000 tons ; and in 1953, 60,450 tons. Thus 
during the total period of operations a total of 113,409 
tons were mined and processed. During each year of 
the operations, as further shown by the Exhibit, the cost 
of recovering the gold exceeded substantially the value 
of the gold recovered; and it is uncontradicted that ulti-
mate discontinuance of the mining operations was dic-
tated by this cost factor. 
The particular significance of the exhibit lies in the 
fact that but a total of 113,409 tons of ore were mined 
up to the time the company finally determined that it 
was economically unsound to attempt further operations, 
and so, whether only 87,000 tons of a 200,000 ton blocked 
out ore body was left in the ground, or 181,000 tons of a 
300,000 ton ore body was left, did not and could not con-
tribute in any wise to plaintiff's loss. In other words, 
for this representation as to tonnage to be actionable, it 
was incu1nbent upon plaintiff to prove that the absence 
of the additional 100,000 tons proximately contributed 
to his drunage. This he not only ,,-holly failed to prove, 
but on the contrary he affinnatively proved that this 
additional 100,000 tons had nothing whatever to do with 
it, because the cmnpany was forced to discontinue opera-
tions long before it had e:xl1austed the acknowled<>'ed ore 
0 
body of 200,000 tons. 
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We submit that upon the basis of the evidence the 
representation that there were 300,000 tons blocked out, 
when there was actually but 200,000 tons, was non-action-
able as a matter of law for the reason that it did not 
result in damage. 
(b) The second representation found by the Court 
to have been made was, 
"That defendant had received an offer to buy 
said mine for $2,000,000, which offer had been re-
fused because said mine was worth more than 
that." (Finding 4 (b) R. 27). 
With respect to this representation, we submit that 
even if false it is non-actionable, first, because it is not 
the type of representation upon which reliance can be 
placed, and second, no damage did or could proximately 
result from its falsity. 
From the standpoint of materiality, neither portion 
of the representation can stand the test. That misrepre-
sentations as to previous offers of purchase cannot for1n 
the basis of actionable fraud has been established in a 
long series of decisions, dating from very early days. 
For example, in 1 Rolle, Abr. 801, pl. 6, it is said: 
"If a man having a term for years offers to 
sell it to another, and says that a stranger would 
give him 20 pounds for it, by means of which as-
sertion the other buys it, when in truth the vendor 
was never offered 20 pounds for the term, though 
the vendee is deceived in the value, yet in truth 
no action on the case lies. And it has been assert-
ed that a statement by the vendor that he has been 
offered a certain sum for his property is not a 
representation of fact which may be relied upon 
as the foundation for a charge of fraud." 
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Page v. Parker (N.H.) 80 Am. Dec.173-177: 
"No action will lie for a false representation 
by the vendor concerning the value of the thing 
sold, it being deemed the folly of the P"':rchaser to 
credit the assertion and beside, value IS a matter 
of judgment and es-fimation about which men may 
differ. Nor will an action lie for a false affirma-
tion that a person bid a particular sum for the 
estate, although the vendee was thereby induced 
to purchase, and was deceived as to the value." 
Cole v. Smith (Colo.) 58 Pac. 1086: 
"A mere affirmation or exaggeration, by the 
vendor of real estate, of its value and the price 
he has been offered for it, are, 'as stated by Kerr 
in his work on Fraud and :Jiistake, at Page 84,' 
assumed to be so commonly made by persons hav-
ing property for sale that a purchaser cannot 
safely place confidence in them": *** it is quite 
uniformly held that a staten1ent by a vendor that 
he had been offered a certain sum for his prop-
erty, or that it is of any given value, are not such 
representations of fact as to be the foundation of 
an action." 
Clark v. MorriU, (~Iaine) 145 A 7±-±: 
"So far as representations as to value of the 
stock are concerned, if such were n1ade, the law 
is well settled in this state that the staten1ent3 
of the vendor as to its value, or the price which he 
has given or been offered for it, are so connnonly 
n1ade by those having property to sell in order to 
enhance its value, that any purchaser who con-
fides in then1 is considered as too careless of his 
own interests to be entitled to relief, even if the 
statements are false and are intended to deceive.~' 
Palrrwr Y. Bell, 85 l\fe. 352, :27 ~\ :230~ Lona Y. 
Woodman, 58 Me. 49, 52; Bvshop Y. Small, 63,:Me. 
12; Bourn v. Davis, 76 l\Ie. 223; B~raley Y. Pazccrs. 
92 Me. 203, 42 A 362." 
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The (b) portion of the statement to the effect that 
the mine was worth more than $2,000,000.00, is, of course, 
but an opinion of value and not actionable. Particularly 
is this true when evaluating a mining property. As stated 
in Byers v. Federal Land Company, 3 F. (2) 9, 
"A statement of the monetary value of the 
property with no definite market value such as a 
mine, an invention, old and used goods, or of 
lands, is generally made and understood as an ex-
pression of opinion only, and not as a representa-
tion of fact, and is not ordinarily an actionable 
representation." 
And in Myers v. Charness (Ok.) 245 P. 879, which 
concerned representations of value as to a partially 
drilled oil well, the court held the alleged representation 
not actionable, citing Gordon v. Butler, 105 U.S. 553, 26 
L. Ed. 1166, where the Supreme Court of the United 
States held: 
"Whenever property of any kind depends for 
its value upon contingencies which may never 
occur, or developments which may never be made, 
opinion as to its value must, necessarily be more 
or less of a speculative character; and no action 
will lie for its expression, however fallacious it 
may prove, or whatever the injury a reliance up-
on it may produce." 
There is still a further reason why this represen-
tation is non-actionable in this case. 
As previously noted, for this representation to be 
actionable, the falsity thereof must proximately have re-
sulted in damage to the plaintiff. In other words, the 
fact that no such offer to purchase was ever made must 
be shown by the evidence to have adversely affected the 
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value of the note as measured by the Company's inability 
to repay the same. 
To state the proposition is to negative it. While it 
might be argued from plaintiff's standpoint that the 
factual existence of such an offer having been made 
might be an inducement for his making the loan, in-
ducement is not enough, and certainly there is no evi-
dence whatever to the effect that the existence or non-
existence of the offer did or could affect one way or an-
other the value of the note. 
In this connection it is to be noted that plaintiff 
under cross-examination was questioned closely as to the 
offer to which Mr. Duvall allegedly referred, being one 
that was then pending, or one that had been made and 
rejected, and plaintiff was adamant that it was one that 
had been rejected (Tr. 197). Thus, whether it had never 
been made, as found by the court, or whether it had in 
fact been made and rejected, forces the same conclusion, 
namely, that it wasn't and could not be a contributing 
factor to the value of plaintiff's note or of the con1pany's 
ability to repay the same. 
Damage is an essential ele1nent of fraud, and unless 
the falsity of the representation relied upon proximately 
results 'in damage to the plaintiff, it is at most but 
"fraud in the air." 
(c) The third representation found by the court 
to have been n1ade was, 
"That said 1nine was then in fine condition~ 
when in truth and in fact defendant well knew 
that said mine was not in fine condition either 
' financially or in good 1nechanical operatino- con-
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dition." (Finding 4 (c), R. 27) 
While we do not find any case in which this exact 
language "fine condition" was construed, there are those 
sufficiently close in context as to make it apparent that 
the representation is not of an actionable character. 
For exan1ple, in Ackerman v. Bramwell Investment 
Company, 80 Utah 52, 12 P. (2) 623, it was held that a 
representation that a "note was as good as gold" was but 
opinion and exaggeration, and not actionable. 
In l( innear v. Prows, supra, the representation that 
a company was "doing well and was a paying business" 
was but opinion and not actionable. 
In Hull v. Flinders, 83 Utah 158, 27 P. (2) 56, repre-
sentations that a company was "safe as any bank in 
Ogden," and "its bonds were as good as gold coin" were 
held to be expressions of opinion, and not actionable. 
In Campbell v. Zion's Coop Home Buiding Co., 46 
Utah 1, 148 P. 401, the Court said: 
"The statements that investors will 'get hand-
some returns,' that their 'investments will be safe,' 
that 'fortunes had been 1nade in the same line,' 
that the 'stock was worth a dollar a share and 
would double in value,' that purchasers 'could not 
lose, took no chance,' that if they 'were dissatis-
fied with their stock the con1pany would buy it 
back at par,' and statements concerning the mere 
worth or value of the defendant's holdings or 
assets, future costs and expenses of operation, 
futttre profits to be derived from the business, or 
from the purchase of stocks or other investments, 
the future ability of the defendant to pay divi-
dends, and other similar expressions and state-
ments, that 'the purchase of 5,000 shares would 
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make the purchaser independent fo~ l~e, wo~d 
not have to work any more,' that this Is_ the bi?-
gest thing I ever knew in 1ny life, the. biggest m 
the state, the best thing ever sold, a mighty good 
thing,' and other similar statements and ex~res­
sions are mere opinions, beliefs, future promises, 
assurances, or happenings, or 'trade talk' and 
'puffings,' and not, in themselves, actionable.~' 
(Italics added.) 
In the light of the foregoing it is obvious that a 
statement by the defendant that the mine was in "fine 
condition" could not under any circumstances be con-
strued as other than opinion, and not actionable. 
Another reason why this representation is not ac-
tionable lies in the fact that the trial court did not pur-
port to find that the mine was not in fine condltion as 
represented by the defendant, but on the contrary limited 
its finding to the fact that it was not in "fine condition 
* * * financially or in good 1nechanical operating condi-
tion." 
We appreciate that the expression "'fine condition,, 
is so relative in nature as not to be subject to a categori-
cal negative finding, and that the court could not in the 
very nature of things find that the mine as such was not 
in fine condition. In this respect, accordingly~ the find-
ing of falsity as spelled out by the trial court, constitutes 
something considerably less than 1naterial falsity. 
Whether a company is in ••fine financial or good 
rnechanical operating condition" is a condition of degree. 
What is fine in one 1nan 's opinion 1nay only be good in 
another's or s01uething less than even good, because they 
1nay be applying different standards. Here the company 
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had just completed its 1952 operations with a run of 
27,000 tons and $99,000 sales proceeds as compared with 
21,000 tons and $7 4,000 sales in 1951. While recoveries 
were still low, and overall expenses still exceeded oper-
ating income, the engineers felt that with the new im-
provements that had been installed in the fall of 1952, or 
were being installed, that they were getting the problem 
of recoveries licked. Extensive stripping operations had 
been undertaken to prepare the ore body for the coming 
year's operations, and, despite set backs of previous 
years, operations for the con1ing year were viewed with 
confidence. 
Mr. Duvall himself had reflected his own confidence 
in the condition of the mine as it then existed, and in its 
future, by putting an additional $5,000.00 of his own 
money into the Company on December 9, 1952, less than 
two weeks prior to the date of plaintiff's loan. 
Under the circumstances it can well be said that the 
mine as such was in the opinion of its operators in "fine 
condition" despite the fact that the Company still had 
financial troubles and 1nechanical operating problems, 
and it is obvious that the trial court had this in mind 
in limiting its finding of falsity as it did. 
(d) The fourth representation found by the court 
to have been rnade, was, 
"That it would be impossible for any investor 
to lose one cent of money, as there was more than 
enough blocked out to pay all notes with interest, 
when in truth and in fact said mining operation 
was then costing more than was being received 
therefrom, and there was not sufficient income 
from production to pay the obligations owing by 
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the corporation or the costs of operation." (Find-
ing 4 (d), R. 27) . 
This representation should for the purpose of con-
sidering materiality be broken into two parts, (a) it 
would be impossible for any investor to lose one cent of 
money, and (b) there was more than enough ore blocked 
out to pay all notes with interest. 
The (a) part, that it would be impossible for any 
investor to lose one cent of money, is so obviously a 
matter of opinion and but a forecast of the future as to 
require little comment. The Utah cases of Ackerman v. 
Bramwell Investment Company, Kinnear v. Prows, Hull 
v. Flinders, Campbell v. Zions Co-op, all supra, establish 
that any statement such as this cannot under any cir-
cumstances form the basis for an action in fraud. 
In the sa1ne category is the (b) part of the repre-
sentation, that then~ was enough ore blocked out to pay 
all notes with interest. Certainly this is nothing more 
than a forecast of the Company's future operations. No 
one could contend nor did the plaintiff so attempt in this 
case, that notes could be paid from ore in the ground, 
blocked out or otherwise. The purport of the representa-
tion is that with the processing of the blocked out ore 
and the sale of the gold, there would be adequate reve-
nues to pay the notes, which is plainly and simply a fore-
cast of the results of future operations. Reference again 
is 1nade to the case of Campbell Y. Zions Co-op., supra. 
in which this Court specifically held that state1nents of 
"],uture costs and expenses of operation, fu-
ture profits to be derived from tl1e business, *u. 
the future ability of defendant to pay dividends, 
and other sin1ilar expressions and statmnents *u 
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are mere opinions, beliefs, future promises, assur-
ances, or happenings, or 'trade talk' and 'puff-
ings,' and not in themselves actionable." 
The value of the ore from the standpoint of plain-
tiff depended upon its being processed, an act to take 
place in the future, the occurrence of which depended up-
on future contingencies. As stated in Limerick v. Jeff-
erson Life Insuranc.e Co. (Okla.) 169 P.lOSO: 
"The general rule is that, whenever property 
of any kind depends for its value upon a contin-
gency which may never occur, or developments 
which may never be made, opinion as to its value 
must necessarily be more or less of a speculative 
character; and no action will lie for its expression, 
however fallacious it may prove, or whatever the 
injury a reliance upon it may produce." 
Another reason why the representation is not action-
able lies in the absence of any finding of falsity by the 
trial court. It is indeed significant that the lower court, 
in lieu of finding that the representation was false as 
made, or in lieu of finding "that there was not enough 
ore blocked out to pay all notes with interest" (a finding 
it obviously could not make as there was no evidence 
whatever on the subject), limited itself to finding that 
operating costs were then in excess of mining receipts, 
and that production income was insufficient to pay cor-
porate obligations or operating costs-matters complete-
ly irrelevant to the subject of the representation. 
While these factors might cast some doubt on the 
company's ability to pay its obligations, they certainly 
are by no means conclusive, and being inconclusive do 
not establish falsity. It is common knowledge that many 
companies operate at a loss, sometimes over extended 
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periods of time, supplementing operating income by bor-
rowings, so the finding of the court, which finding is in 
the language of the pleadings, that operating costs ex-
ceeded operating income, and that income from produc-
tion was insufficient to pay the company's obligations, 
is of no aid to the plaintiff. 
Be that as it may, the whole subject of falsity of 
these statements is of no consequence because the state-
ments themselves are non-actionable as a matter of law. 
6. THE LOWER COURT NEGLECTED AND REFUSED 
TO MAKE FINDINGS OF FACT AS REQUIRED 
BY THE UTAH RULES OF ·CIVIL PROCEDURE. 
Under Rule 52, U.R.C.P. the trial court is required 
to make findings of fact, unless the same are waived. 
By Rule 52 (b) a party may, within 10 days after entry 
of judgment, 1nove the court to amend its findings or to 
make additional findings. 
The findings of fact, conclusions of law and judg-
ment herein were entered on August 25, 1958. Within ten 
days thereafter the defendant n1oved the court to amend 
its findings and for additional findings. Defendant in 
so moving set out in writing the precise matters upon 
which he desired findings 1nade ( R. 31). The n1otion "·as 
set for hearing and dui~~ argued by counsel for both 
parties. At the conclusion of the argun1ent the court 
denied defendant's nwtion, and declined to 1nake any 
further or additional findings, but did correct the find-
ings, conclusions and judg1nent to provide interest at 
6o/o rather than 7/~,, and to allow a credit upon the judg-
ment in the anwunt of Three Hundred Thirty Six 
($336.00) Dollars instead of Two Hundred Twenty Four 
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( $224.00) Dollars. 
The rule is, of course, and this court has so held time 
and time again, that it is the duty of the trial court to 
find upon all material issues raised by the pleadings and 
by the evidence, and that where the evidence on specific 
issues is insufficient, the court must make negative find-
ings. Failure to make findings on material issues is 
reversible error. G~auque v. Salt Lake City, 42 Utah 89, 
129 P. 429; Baker v. Hatch, 70 U. 1, 257 P. 673; Baird 
v. Upper Canal Irrigation Co., 70 Utah 57, 257 P. 1060; 
Thomas v. Clayton Pvano Co., 47 Utah 91, 151 P. 543; 
Mendelson v. Roland, 66 Utah 487, 243 P. 798; Prows v. 
Hawley, 72 Utah 444, 271 P. 31; West v. Standard Fuel 
Co., 81 U. 300, 17 P. (2) 292. 
In resisting defendant's motion for additional find-
ings, plaintiff's counsel argued that the court was not 
required to make negative findings, because a failure to 
find was the equivalent of a negative finding, and fur-
ther, that as long as the ftndings as made supported the 
judgment, that was all that was necessary. We submit 
that defendant was entitled to findings one way or the 
other upon the several matters requested by it, and that 
it was the duty of the court to make them. We will review 
them briefly. 
First, the court will recall from what has previously 
been said, that defendant has maintained that the repre-
sentation that there was 300,000 tons blocked out was 
not actionable, (1) because it was not material, and (2) 
because it did not proximately result in damage. Both 
of these points involved material issues in the case, and 
bearing thereon was the uncontradicted evidence that at 
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the time the company discontinued its operations in the 
fall of 1953 it had mined but a total of 113,000 tons. Thus, 
whether there was originally 300,000 tons as represented 
by defendant or but 200 000 as claimed by plaintiff and 
' ' found by the court, went only to the question of how 
much was left in the ground. Further, the presence or 
absence of the additional 100,000 tons did not and could 
not add to or detract from plaintiff's damages. 
Thus the facts established by the uncontradicted evi-
dence that the company finally discontinued operations 
after mining but 113,000 tons, and that it did so because 
its operating costs continued to exceed its operating in-
come, were material upon the issue of damages because 
those facts established as a matter of law that no damage 
resulted to plaintiff by reason of there being but 200,000 
tons blocked out instead of 300,000. Defendant's request-
ed findings 1, 2, 3 and 4 (R. 31) were directed to these 
facts, and the court erred in refusing to make findings 
thereon. 
True it is that the findings as requested would not 
support the judgment the court desired to enter, and that 
contrary findings would not find support in the evidence, 
but that is no justification for ignoring those facts for 
what they are. 
Second, as previously noted. the plaintiff alleged 
and offered proof that defendant represented to him that 
the rninin1urn value of the ore was $4.20 per ton, its 
average value was $7.00 per ton, that all the bills were 
paid, and that $30,000.00 worth of gold was being shipped 
rnonthly. The r_naking of these representations was de-
nied by defendant, but the court cmnpletely jgnored them 
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in its findings. By paragraphs 5, 6, 11 and 12 of his 
requests, defendant requested the court to find that the 
representations were not made. This the court declined, 
apparently upon the ground that its failure to find that 
they were made is the equivalent of finding that th~y 
were not rnade. We submit that the court in refusing 
defendant's requests for specific findings upon these 
issues was deliberately arbitrary and capricious. 
Defendant's requests 14, 15 and 16 involved directly 
the issue of damages. Specifically, plaintiff's own evi-
dence had shown that while he made the loan by drawing 
a check on his business account, he shortly thereafter 
replaced the same with moneys jointly owned by himself 
and Mrs. Greenwell, and that the note he received to 
evidence the loan was payable to himself and Mrs. Green-
well jointly. This evidence was uncontradicted, but the 
court nevertheless refused to find that such constituted 
the true facts. Certainly under this evidence an award 
of judgment in favor of plaintiff based on the full amount 
of the note, which judgment completely ignores the joint 
interest of :Mrs. Greenwell, cannot stand, and the trial 
court was obligated to rnake appropriate findings in 
accord with this evidence. 
As plaintiff's damages were n1easured by the amount 
of the Duvall Company obligation, which in turn was 
evidenced by the note, there could be no finding in his 
favor until the court specifically found the amount of 
his ownership interest in the note. It was, accordingly 
mandatory upon the trial court to rnake findings in rela-
tion to Mathilda B. Greenwell, which would in turn defeat 
the judgment ordered in favor of the plaintiff. 
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A final group of requested findings, namely, re-
quests 21 and 22, related to the value of the note of the 
Duvall Company ( $5,000.00 principal) and the value 
of the 500 shares of Duvall Company stock as of Decem-
ber 22, 1952, the date upon which they were received by 
plaintiff in return for the $5,000.00 loan. 
This court has stated and restated the proposition 
that damages in a fraud action are measured by the dif-
ference in value as of the time of the fraud, of the prop-
erty received by plaintiff, and the value the property 
would have then had if defendant's representations had 
been true. In other words, in the instant case, the differ-
ence in the value of the note and the stock as of December 
22, 1952, and their then value had defendant's repre-
sentations been true. Kinnear v. Prows, supra; Pace v. 
Parrish, supra. And in Hecht v. J.lletzler, 1-± Utah 408, 
48 Pac. 37, this court stated: 
"'Vith reference to da1nages, the case must be 
tried just as it ''Tould have been tried the day after 
the contract was n1ade, if the question had arisen 
at that tiine." 
It was, accordingly, 1nandatory upon the court and 
essential that it find the value of the note and the stock 
as of Dece1nber :2:2, 195:2. If they then had some value, 
then plajntifl''~ judg1nent (disregarding for present pur-
poses the interest of 1\Irs. Greenw·ell) would be the dif-
ference hPhH'l'll that nllue and $5,000.00. If theoretically 
t lwy had no Yalue (a finding that could not be 1uade un-
d<'r tllP evidence in this case). then the dmnages could 
h<' til<> full $5,000.00. But the point is that smnewhere 
tlw trial court n1ust 1nake a specific finding of value 
with rl'~ped to the note and stock as of December ~~. 
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1952, which was specifically called to the Court's atten-
tion by defendant's requests for findings 21 and 22, which 
it has so far failed and refused to do. The reason for its 
refusal is patent-there is simply no evidence upon which 
it can predicate such a finding. There is no evidence 
that they were wholly without value, nor is there any 
evidence that they were of any particular value. It's a 
case of no evidence at all as to what the value was, which 
in and of itself defeats the judgment, as the burden was 
on plaintiff to establish such value or lack of value, and 
failing therein his action must fail. 
It was, accordingly incumbent upon the court to find, 
as requested by defendant, that the note and stock was 
not wholly without value, even though it could not specify 
any particular value. 
At this time we take cognizance of the fact that the 
court did find as follows: 
"7. At the time of said advance, and at all 
times since, the said Duvall Company was and is 
insolvent and unable to pay the amount of said 
advance and said stock was at the time of said 
delivery worthless and of no value." 
We anticipate that plaintiff may urge that such 
finding of general insolvency is the equivalent of a spe-
cific finding of "no value" as to the note, but we submit 
such is not the case. Insolvency means many things to 
many persons, and different things to different courts. 
It may, for example, mean only an inability to pay one's 
obligations promptly as they mature-which is a far cry 
from meaning that the obligations are wholly worthless. 
Or the word may refer to a situation where one's lia-
bilities exceed in total amount one's total assets, in which 
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event the insolvent's obligations may still be of substan-
tial value. If there is property out of which the obligor 
may p~y any percentage of his obligation, the obligation 
is not without value, even though the obligor may be in-
solvent. As stated in Luse v. Rea (Tex.) 207 S.W. 942: 
"One may have sufficient property out of 
which to pay any percentage of his debt less than 
100 percent, and yet be insolvent, and the conclu-
sion that one is insolvent does not justify the con-
clusion that his note is wholly worthless." 
We submit, accordingly, that the finding that the 
Duvall Company "was and is insolvent and unable to pay 
the amount of said advance" is not a finding that the 
note then was valueless, but is at most a finding that its 
value may have been something less than 100%. What 
that value was the court should have found, and if there 
was no evidence fro1n which it could make a finding 
(which is the case here) it should have dismissed the ac-
tion for failure of proof. 
Nor does the subsequent finding (Finding 8, R. 28) 
as follows: 
"'8. Thereafter. and before said promissory 
note beca1ne due, the said Duvall Cmnpany assign-
ed its assets for the benefit of creditors and said 
assets han? been cmnpletel~,. liquidated, from 
which liquidation plaintiff has received, on or 
about ~{arch 6, 195S. the sun1 of $336.00." 
aid pJainti ff iu this Inatter. rl_1he fact that the note may 
su b~('quen tly to Dece1nber ~:2. ln5:? have depreciated in 
value is of no ~ignifieance. Here the assign1nent for bene-
l'i t of creditors wa8 1nade nearly a year and a half after 
the note wa~ given, and the faet that plaintiff received 
but $336.00 though that liquidation is certainly not the 
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equivalent of a finding that such was all the note and 
stock was worth a year and a half earlier. Any number 
of things for which the defendant may not be held re-
sponsible may have intervened during this one and a 
half year period which affected the company's ability 
to repay the note. 
We sub1nit that the trial court had a duty to make 
specific findings upon the several matters herein dis-
cussed, and that its failure and refusal so to do consti-
tutes prejudicial and reversible error. 
7. THERE IS NO PROOF OF DAMAGE TO PLAINTIFF 
IN THIS CASE. 
Several facets of this point of argument have here-
tofore been discussed, as for example, the requirement 
that damage proximately result from the falsity of the 
representation, and the necessity for specific findings, 
but the question of the correct theory of damages in a 
fraud action is so critical in this case: and in similar cases 
yet to be tried, we feel it merits further consideration. 
As previously pointed out, the general rule as laid 
down by this court in its previous decisions (Kinear v. 
Prows) supra) Pace v. Parrish) supra), is that damages 
in a fraud action are measured by the difference in value 
as of the tirne of the fraud, between the property re-
ceived by the plaintiff, and the value the property then 
would have had if defendant's representations had been 
true. As stated in Hecht v.lvletzler) supra) 
"With reference to damages, the case rnust be 
tried just as it would have been tried the day after 
the contract was nmde, if the question had arisen 
at that time." 
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The fact that the property here involved is the com-
pany's promissory note, representing its undertaking to 
repay the loan, coupled with some shares of stock, does 
not change the rule. 
For the purpose of determining damages it is still 
incumbent upon the court to reconstruct from competent 
evidence the dollar value of plaintiff's interest in the 
promissory note as of the date of the loan, December 22, 
1952, and compare that value with plaintiff's interest 
in the face amount thereof. If it is less than the plain-
tiff's interest in the face amount, and the difference is 
proximately attributable to the falsity of defendant's 
representaton, such difference and only such difference 
represents plaintiff's recoverable damages. 
The rule of law sometimes indulged in other types 
of cases to the effect that where exact damages are diffi-
cult to prove, the plaintiff need onl~~ prove them as best 
he can, has no application in a fraud action where dam-
age is an elen1ent of the offense itself, and, rnust be 
proven by clear and conrincing eridence. 
A case that denwnstrates the point is that of Crow-
ley v. Goodrich, (\~t.) 44 .A .. (2) 1:2S. There the plaintiff 
n1ade a loan for $2,000.00, evidenced by the promissory 
note of Ooodrich-Daniell Lun1ber Cmnpany~ and secured 
hy mortgage upon son1e ti1nber land. Plaintiff claimed 
the loan wa~ indueed by the fraud of defendant, and 
~u('d for damages. It was established that the security 
wn~ of the valne of not to exet•ed $600.00, but no express 
l'inding ol' ~ueh value was 1nade by the trial court, and 
til<' court. ga.Vl' plaintiff judgn1ent for $:2,:214.33, repre-
~t>Hting the face of the note and interest. 
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On appeal the defendant contended that no damages 
were awardable because the court did not make any 
findings with respect to the value of the security, or of 
the note independent of the security, and wit}wut those 
findings no judgment could stand. Plaintiff, on the other 
hand, contended that if defendant was entitled to any 
deduction because of values of the note and mortgage, 
the burden was on him to prove such values. With re-
spect to a deduction for the value of the security, i.e., 
the mortgage, the court held that the trial court should 
have determined such value as of the date of the trans-
action and deducted it, and that the burden of proving 
the mortgage was without value, if such was plaintiff's 
contention, and of securing appropriate findings there-
on, was on the plaintiff. 
However, and this is the principal point we are de-
veloping, the court went on and pointed out that in 
addition to the mortgage security, the plaintiff held the 
company's note, and that plaintiff must prove what if any 
value it had as of the date of the transaction in addition 
to the value of the mortgage, to the end that the trial 
court might also make proper deduction therefor. The 
court said: 
"In the present case the plaintiffs, in addition 
to the mortgage on the timber, held the note of the 
Lumber Corporation for $2,000. Any payment 
made to the plaintiffs on this note should have 
been credited to the defendant in mitigation of 
damages. 11erchants National Bank v. Taylor, 
supra. In order that no deduction from damages 
be allowed for value of this note, it was incumbent 
on the plaintiffs to allege and prove that vt was 
not collectible at the time the loan was made be-
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cause of the insolvency of maker or for any other 
sufficient reason." 
Thus, in the instant case one of the critical questions 
for the trial court upon the issue of damages, was what 
was the value of plaintiff's interest in the note as of De-
cember 22, 1952, which was nearly a year prior to the 
company's terminating its operations, as compared to its 
value (which could not in any event have exceeded the 
face amount thereof) had defendant's representations 
been true. 
On this point plaintiff originally pleaded only that 
"at the present time the Duvall Company is insolvent and 
unable to pay its obligations," which obviously meant 
nothing as it referred at most to a situation that existed 
when the cmnplaint was filed, some two and a half years 
subsequent to the date of the transaction. Thus, no action-
able damage was there pleaded. 
By the an1endments to the complaint (Par. 6, R. 17) 
the plaintiff substituted the following for the foregoing: 
"6. By reason of the false representations 
of the defendant, plaintiff was induced to advance 
to the said Duvall rmnpany, on or about Decem-
ber 21, 193:2. the sun1 of $5,000.00 as a loan, for 
which adYance plaintiff received the promissory 
note of the Duvall Cmnpany in the mnount of 
$5,000.00 and stock in the emnpany of the par 
value of $5,000.00; that at said tin1e and since the 
said Duvall Cmnpany was insolvent and unable 
to pay ~aid prmnissory note and said stock was 
worthlPss and of no value.·· 
'The pfft>et of the runendn1ent is to plead insolvency 
of the Duvall Company as of the date of the transaction, 
but no where has the plaintiff pleaded that the note was 
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then worthless, or that its then value was anything less 
than its face amount. The most that can be said of the 
pleading is that the Duvall Company was then unable 
to pay the note in full, which is certainly something very 
different from pleading that it was worthless. The plain-
tiff was very meticulous in pleading that the stock he 
received was worthless, but equally meticulous in avoid-
ing pleading that the note was other than of substantial 
value. 
We submit that even as of now plaintiff's complaint 
is fatally defective in its allegations of actionable damage. 
Apart from the pleadings, however, what was the 
proof~ Many exhibits in the form of operating reports 
were introduced by plaintiff to the end of proving that 
the operation lost money from the start-a point defend-
ant has not and does not deny. The reports of his engin-
eers and technicians demonstrate, however, that they had 
continuing faith in their ability to correct the technical 
shortcomings in the operation, and ultimately to get it on 
a profitable basis. Those reports and those exhibits, 
however, do not reach the fundamental question now 
under consideration, namely, that of value as of Decem-
ber 1952-and with respect to which the court in effect 
found a total absence of value even though the plaintiff 
neither pleaded nor proved the note to be valueless. 
There is, however, one exhibit in the record that 
points unerringly to this problem, and which demon-
strates conclusively the fallacy of the trial court's con-
clusion that the note was of no value. This exhibit is the 
copy of the company's federal income tax return for the 
year 1952 (Exhibit Q), which incorporated a balance 
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sheet showing the company's condition as of the very 
time we are here concerned, December 1952. This exhibit 
was offered by plaintiff, and received by the court on 
plaintiff's behalf. It was prepared by the company's ac-
countants, Messrs. Wells, Baxter and Miller, and no 
suggestion has been made that it is other than accurate. 
Even the most casual examination of this exhibit dis-
closes that the Company in December 1952, had very 
tangible assets, and thus a determination by the court 
that the note was then wholly without value, a finding 
which was not in fact made but which is the only basis 
upon which the judgment could be justified, not only 
finds no support in the evidence, but is contrary to the 
uncontradicted evidence. 
Further, and in addition to the tangible value dis-
closed by the exhibit, are the intangibles-the hopes and 
prospects. By hindsight it may now righteously be stated 
that those hopes and prospects were somewhat negative, 
but such can be said of almost every undertaking that 
ultimately fails. In December, 1952, hopes were still 
high, and it is in that light that values must be deter-
mined. 
Enlightening upon this point is the observation of 
the Supreme Court of Oregon in the case of Menefee v. 
Blitz, (Ore.) 179 P. ( 2), 550, a case not dissilnilar to the 
present, albeit in that case oil was involved instead of 
gold, and corporate stock instead of a eorporate note: 
"The evidence indicates, in our opinion, that 
the stock possessed value on the day of its pur-
chase. We shall now recite the facts upon which 
we base that staten1ent. The stock under consid-
eration was issued by a corporation which \Yas 
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seeking to extract hidden treaure, in the form of 
oil, from the bowels of the earth. It might develop 
that there was no oil in the stratum for which the 
drill was headed, but the things which man hopes 
he will find in the unknown often lend to a project 
more value than the things which he actually 
possessses. The corporation in which the respond-
ent bought his stock was following a plan of action 
which was devised by a competent geologist; the 
latter was in charge of the drill. At the beginning 
it was thought that oil in large quantities would 
be found in the Vaqueros sand and that the latter 
would be encountered at a depth of about 3,000 
feet. It was assumed, however, that it might be 
necessary to go down much deeper. When the 
respondent purchased his stock, the drill had not 
yet reached the Vaqueros sand. When the drilling 
stopped in September 1937 hopes of discovering 
oil had not been abandoned. They were still enter-
tained notwithstanding discouraging develop-
ments. The cessation of activities was 'because 
they ran out of money and the equipment was no 
good.' Those are the words of the respondent 
himself." 
Such was the case here, and we submit that there is 
no evidence whatever in the record to support the judg-
ment based on the full face amount of the note, first, 
because the uncontradicted evidence discloses that the 
plaintiff owned less than the full amount thereof, and he 
could not under any circumstances recover more than 
the value of his interest, and second, such evidence estab-
lishes that the note on December 22, 1952, had substantial 
value, and without a finding specifically as to that value, 
any judgment must fail. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, and each thereof, the 
judgment of the trial court cannot be permitted to stand, 
but should and must be summarily reversed. It is further 
abundantly clear from plaintiff's own evidence that ac-
tionable fraud does not exist in this case for the reasons, 
( 1) the representations relied upon by the plaintiff are 
non-actionable as a matter of law, and ( 2) the damage 
suffered by plaintiff, if any, did not flow from the falsity 
of any representation allegedly made by defendant, but 
on the contrary found its causation in circumstances and 
conditions inherent in the mining operation, wholly un-
related to any representation or statement made by the 
plaintiff. 
This case should be remanded to the lower court 
under instructions that it be dismissed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HOWELL, STINE AND OLMSTEAD 
RICHARD W. CAMPBELL 
Attorneys for Appellant 
56 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
